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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-EMINENT Do-
MAIN-REGULATORY TAKING-The United States Supreme Court
held that land use regulations that deprive a landowner of all eco-
nomically viable use of property categorically require
compensation.
Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, US , 112 S Ct 2886
(1992).
In December 1986, David H. Lucas ("Lucas") purchased two
oceanfront lots ("lots") on the Isle of Palms, South Carolina1 . Lu-
cas paid $975,000.00 for the two lots, on which he intended to
build single family homes.2
On July 1, 1988, the South Carolina Legislature amended the
1977 Coastal Zone Management Act 3 by enacting the 1988 Beach-
front Management Act4 ("Act"). The Coastal Zone Management
Act created the South Carolina Coastal Council ("Council") to en-
force the provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act.5 The
Act prohibits the construction of any permanent structure on Lu-
cas' lots.' Lucas filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common
1. Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, US , 112 S Ct 2886, 2889 (1992).
2. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2889. The lots are situated approximately 300 feet from the
ocean. Lucas' lots are separated by a lot on which a house had been built in the early 1980's.
There were also houses on the properties on either side of the Lucas lots. Id.
3. South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act, SC Code Ann § 48-39-10 (Law
Co-op 1987).
4. South Carolina Beachfront Management Act, SC Code Ann § 48-39-250 (Law Co-
op 1990 Supp).
5. SC Code Ann §§ 48-39-40, 48-39-50(I) (Law Co-op 1987). The purpose of this act
is "to protect the quality of the coastal environment. SC Code Ann § 48-39-30(a)(Law
Co-op 1987).
6. Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 SC 376, 404 SE2d 895(1991), cert
granted 112 S Ct 436 (1991). The 1988 Act established a forty-year policy of retreat from
the shoreline, SC Code Ann § 48-39-280(A) (Law Co-op 1990 Supp), and charged the Coun-
cil to establish a baseline paralleling the shoreline. The Act requires the setback line be
established landward of the baseline at a distance equal to 40 times the annual erosion rate.
SC Code Ann § 48-39-280(B) (Law Co-op 1990 Supp). SC Code Ann § 48-39-280(A)
prohibits
[any] new construction or reconstruction ...seaward of the baseline except:
(1) wooden walkways no larger in width than six feet;
(2) small wooden decks no larger than one hundred forty-four square feet;
Id.
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Pleas,' alleging that the restriction constituted a taking without
just compensation in violation of the United States and South Car-
olina Constitutions.$
The Court of Common Pleas held that the restriction was a reg-
ulatory taking and awarded Lucas $1,232,387.50 as just compensa-
tion.' The Council appealed the decision to the South Carolina Su-
preme Court.10 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower court.11 The court held that when the state
exercises its police power to prevent serious public harm, it owes
no compensation for any resulting property deprivation.12 The
South Carolina court held that Lucas' concession of the validity of
the Act"3 included a concession that construction would cause seri-
ous public harm, 4 warranting the application of the Mugler test 5
and a finding that the regulation was not a taking. 6 The South
Carolina court rejected Lucas' argument that, regardless of the
purpose of the regulation, the test for a regulatory taking is the
deprivation of all economically viable use of the property. 7 Lucas
appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari."
The Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court and re-
manded the case. 9 The Court2 ° began its analysis by pointing out
that, prior to Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon," a taking was only
7. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2890.
8. "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken without just compensation." US Const
Amend V. "[P]rivate property shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the
owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first made therefor." SC Const
Art I § 13. The South Carolina Supreme Court did not utilize any state constitutional analy-
sis in this case, focusing instead on federal constitutional analysis. Lucas, 404 SE2d at 898.
9. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2890.
10. Lucas, 404 SE2d at 896.
11. Id.
12. Lucas, 404 SE2d at 901 (citations omitted).
13. Lucas, 404 SE2d at 896.
14. Id at 900.
15. Id, citing Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623 (1887). Mugler held that there is no tak-
ing when the state exercises its police power to prevent a serious public harm. See notes 74-
76 and accompanying text.
16. Lucas, 404 SE2d at 902.
17. Id at 898:
18. 112 S Ct 436 (1991).
19. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2902.
20. Justice Scalia writing for the majority was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas.
21. 260 US 393 (1922). The Mahon court held that a regulation that goes too far
results in a taking of private property. See notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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found in cases of physical occupation of property.22 However, the
Mahon court recognized that a regulation that limits the use of
property may effect a taking of property if it goes "too far."'2 3 The
Court noted that it had never set a definitive test, deciding instead
on a case by case basis whether a regulation goes too far. '
However, the Court noted that two categories of regulation re-
quire compensation without specific inquiry.2 5 The first category
includes regulations that accomplish a physical occupation of prop-
erty.26 The second category includes regulations that deny all eco-
nomically beneficial use of the land. 27 The majority noted that the
Court has never justified the total deprivation of use rule,28 but it
maintains that such deprivation is a taking. 9
The majority agreed that the South Carolina court was correct in
finding that the Supreme Court had held that regulations proscrib-
ing nuisances do not require compensation,3" but that this nui-
sance exception is no longer determinative.3 1 It explained that the
nuisance exception to compensation was the Court's first attempt
to justify the States' exercise of the police power3 2 and cited Agins
et Ux v City of Tiburon3 3 as the refined standard. " The Court said
that it is illogical to allow the nuisance exception to determine
-whether compensation is required because application of that test
would always mean that the police power is unlimited.35
The Court said that if a state regulation deprives a property
owner of all economically beneficial use of his property, the state
may escape the requirement of paying compensation only if it can
show that the proscribed use was not included in the owner's ti-
tle e.3 A suspect regulation could only withstand the challenge if it
22. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2892.
23. Id at 2893. See note 84.
24. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2893 citing Penn Central Transportation v New York City,
438 US 104 (1978). Penn Central is discussed at notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
25. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2893.
26. Id (citations omitted).
27. Id (citations omitted).
28. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2894.
29. Id at 2893.
30. Id at 2897.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 447 US 255 (1980).
34. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2897. The Agins standard succinctly stated, provides that a
regulation does not work a taking if it substantially advances state interests. See notes 121-
123 and accompanying text.




deprives the owner only to the degree allowable by the state's pri-
vate or public nuisance laws."7 Any use that may be prevented
under nuisance law is by definition unlawful and therefore the reg-
ulation has taken nothing.38 If a regulation seeks to prohibit a use
beyond what the state nuisance law could prohibit; the regulation
effects a taking for which compensation must be paid.3 9 The Court
characterized this as a "total taking" standard,4 ° that requires the
same analysis as any application of state law.4'
Justice Kennedy concurred in the decision,42 emphasizing that
the Court did not decide whether a taking had occurred, but had
merely set up a decisional framework. 3 Although he voiced some
doubt over the finding of the South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas that the regulation left Lucas' property completely without
value,44 he acknowledged that such a finding enables Lucas to rely
on the line of cases that developed the loss of value approach to
takings questions.45
Justice Kennedy then explained that the regulation must contra-
dict the property owner's reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions in order for the Court to find that the regulation deprives the
property of all value.4" He said the reasonable expectations must
be viewed in light of our legal tradition,47 not limited to nuisance
law." He went on to explain that the purpose of the Takings
Clause is to protect private expectations to ensure private invest-
ment.49 He thought that the South Carolina Supreme Court erred
37.. Id at 2900.
38. Id at 2900-01.
39. Id at 2901.
40. Id at 2901.
41. Id. The inquiry will include:
[An] analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and re-
sources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities,
.... the social value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in
question .... and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private
landowners) alike.
Id.
42. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2902 (Kennedy concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id at 2903 (Kennedy concurring).
45. Id citing Agins, 447 US at 255. See notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
46. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2903 citing Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 US 164 (1979);
and Penn Central, 438 US 104 (1978). See notes 96- 108, 116-120 and accompanying text.
47. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2903.
48. Id citing Goldblatt v Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590 (1962). See notes 92-95
and text.
49. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2903 (Kennedy concurring).
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by failing to analyze whether the Act was within the property
owner's reasonable expectations. °
Justice Blackmun's dissent 5 accused the Court of overkill in
what he saw as a narrow question.52 He argued first that the South
Carolina Supreme Court was correct to presume the validity of the
Act, especially in the face of Lucas' failure to challenge the Act's
validity. 3 Blackmun also took issue with the Court's elimination of
the case-by-case inquiry when a challenged regulation renders the
property valueless.54 He argued that the Court's takings jurispru-
dence requires a weighing of the economic impact to the owner in
light of the public intent behind the regulation. 5 He cited the
Mugler5e line of cases to illustrate that states can prohibit all inju-
rious uses of private property, without regard to the diminution of
property values.
57
Justice Stevens' dissent decried the majority's abandonment of
precedent in the expansion of regulatory takings analysis.5 8 He
faulted the rule59 expounded by the majority as being without sup-
porting precedent, too narrow, and rigid. 0 He argued that the total
deprivation requirement was arbitrary.6
.Stevens believed that the focus of the Court's rule was too nar-
row.2 He argued that the most important consideration in a tak-
ings equation is the character of the regulation. 3 He admitted that
the regulation had a substantial impact on Lucas' investment-
backed expectations and substantially diminished the value of his
property. 4 However, Stevens found the character of the, Act was
50. Id at 2903-04 (Kennedy concurring).
51. Id at 2904 (Blackmun dissenting).
52. Id. Blackmun said the Court "launche[d] a missile to kill a mouse." Id.
53. Id at 2909 (Blackmun dissenting).
54. Id at 2910 (Blackmun dissenting).
55. Id citing Agins, 447 US at 255. See notes 121-123.
56. Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623 (1887).
57. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2910 (Blackmun dissenting) citing Mugler, 123 US at 623. See
notes 74-76.
58. Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2917 (Stevens dissenting).
59. Id at 2918 (Stevens dissenting).
60. Id. Stevens cited Mugler, 123 US 623, and its progeny to show there was no pre-
cedent and reasoned that the Agins-rule'was merely dicta.
61. Lucas; 112 S Ct at 2919 (Stevens dissenting) (application of the majority's rule
would mean that a landowner who loses 100% of the value of his property would be com-
pensated while a landowner who loses 95% would not) Id.
62. Id at 2922 (Stevens dissenting).
63. Id at 2922-23 (Stevens dissenting).
64. Id at 2924 (Stevens dissenting).
1993
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general, not specific.6 5 He also found the legislative purpose to be
"compelling. '66 He balanced these factors and found that the Act
did not effect a taking.
6 7
In a separate statement, Justice Souter said he would dismiss
the writ of certiorari.6 8 He voiced his belief that it was imprudent
for the Court to reach the merits of this case,' because the case
was based on the conclusion of the trial court that Lucas was de-
prived of all economic value of his property." Souter characterized
this finding as "highly questionable, ' 71 and said that accepting this
finding precluded the Court from establishing the definition of a
total taking.72 He argued that the Court should wait for an oppor-
tunity to define a total taking deprivation and then deal with the
takings aspect of such deprivation.73
Over one hundred years ago, in Mugler v Kansas,74 the Supreme
Court distinguished regulations restricting the use of private prop-
erty from the process of eminent domain, whereby the state physi-
cally takes private property for public use.75 The Court proclaimed
that a valid exercise of a state's police power did not constitute a
taking requiring compensation.76
In Hadacheck v Los Angeles,77 the Court declined the opportu-
nity to decide whether a regulation to prohibit a nuisance effectu-
ated a deprivation of property,7" focusing instead on whether the
65. Id. Stevens defined the statute as general because it regulated the entire state,
not specific property owners. Id.
66. Id at 2925 (Stevens dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id at 2925 (Souter's statement).
69. Id.
70. Id. Souter objected because the South Carolina Supreme Court had not reviewed
the finding of the Common Pleas Court that Lucas had been completely deprived of all
value of his property. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id at 2926 (Souter's statement).
74. 123 US 623 (1887). Petitioner challenged his prosecution under a Kansas law that
prohibited the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, alleging that it worked a taking
of his distillery. The Court held that the legislature may determine that a use is injurious to
the community and that the prohibition of such a use does not effect a taking.
75. Mugler, 123 US at 668-69.
76. Id.
77. 239 US 394 (1915).
78. Hadacheck, 239 US at 394. Petitioner challenged a Los Angeles ordinance that
prohibited the operation of a brickyard within a prescribed area. Among other- grounds,
petitioner alleged that the ordinance deprived him of the value of his property since the clay
on his property was particularly well suited for brick manufacture. Id.
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regulation was a legitimate exercise of the police power.79 The
Court held that the regulation was a valid exercise of the police
power."
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon,81 the Supreme Court took a
different approach to a regulatory taking case.8 2 Rather than focus-
sing their discussion on the validity of the regulation as an exercise
of the police power, the Court questioned how far the police power
may be extended.8 The Court enunciated an indistinct "too far"
standard.84 The Court warned against disregarding constitutional
protections in an effort to protect public health, safety, and wel-
fare."s Justice Brandeis, the sole dissenter, decried the majority's
analysis, echoing the argument that a valid exercise of the police
power does not work a taking. 6
In 1926, and again in 1927, the Supreme Court, relying on its
earlier methodology, upheld zoning ordinances as valid exercises of
the police power and declined an analysis of the regulatory takings
question. The Supreme Court also relied on the authority of the
state to protect the. public interest in deciding that a Virginia stat-
ute which required that certain trees be destroyed did not consti-
tute a taking of property.88
In United States v Central Eureka Mining Co.89, the Court reaf-
79. Id at 411.
80. Id at 414. The Court found that the classification of brickmaking as a nuisance
was not unreasonable, therefore the regulation did not effect a taking.
81. 260 US 393 (1922).
82. Mahon, 260 US at 393. Petitioners asked the court to reverse a Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision which held that a Pennsylvania statute that forbade the mining of
anthracite coal under certain conditions did not amount to a taking of the petitioners' prop-
erty rights to mine the coal. Id.
83. Id at 413. "The question is whether the police power can be stretched so far." Id.
84. "[Wlhile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking." Mahon, 260 US at 415. The Court determined that the
regulation went too far because it benefitted only a small number of homeowners and made
mining commercially impractical. Id at 414-15.
85. Id at 416.
86. Id at 417 (Brandeis dissenting).
87. See Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365 (1926). Petitioner alleged that by
restricting the permissible uses of his property, a zoning ordinance diminished the commer-
cial value of his property, resulting in a taking. The Court found the ordinance to be protec-
tive of the public health, so therefore a valid exercise of the police power and thus not a
taking. See also Goreib v Fox, 274 US 603 (1927). Petitioner challenged a zoning ordinance
that included a setback requirement. The Court found zoning to be a legitimate exercise of
the police power and so did not address the takings question.
88. Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272 (1928). The Court approved the Virginia Legisla-
ture's decision to protect apple trees from rust by requiring that cedar trees be removed.
89. 357 US 155 (1958).
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firmed the Mahon9 ° holding, but declined to find that a compensa-
ble taking resulted from a wartime regulation. 1 In Goldblatt v
Hempstead,92 the Court analyzed the takings issue using both
standards that the Court had previously employed separately.9 3
The Court determined that the regulation did not effect a taking
because it did not reduce the value of the lot"' and because it was a
valid exercise of the police power.9 5
The Goldblatt court's blending of the two discrete approaches
into one test was further refined in Penn Central Transportation
Co."6 In rejecting Petitioner's takings claim, 97 the Court recognized
a two-part test, which concentrated on the nature of the suspect
governmental action and the degree to which the action interfered
with property rights. 8 Applying its test, the Court found that the
law was not a taking9 because the law was a valid exercise of the
police power,1"' and because the law did not extinguish all of the
owners' rights to use the property.' 0 ' The dissenting opinion, 02
while conceding that a state does not take private property when it
prohibits a nuisance, 03 maintained that this nuisance exception
does not extend to every exercise of the police power,104 only to
90. For an illustration of wlhen a regulation may constitute a taking if it goes too far,
see notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
91. Eureka, 357 US at 155. Respondents contended that an order of the War Powers
Board requiring the temporary shutdown of non-essential gold mines was a taking of prop-
erty for which they were owed compensation. The Court held that a regulation that would
otherwise require compensation would not be deemed a taking in time of war.
92. Goldblatt v Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590 (1962). Appellant challenged a local
ordinance which prohibited excavation below the level of water table. Enforcement of the
regulation forbade the operation of a sand and gravel quarry on Goldblatt's lot.
93. In other words, whether the regulation went too far (as used in Mahon) and
whether the regulation was a valid exercise of the 'police power (as used in Mugler).
94. Goldblatt, 369 US at 594.
95. Id at 596.
96. Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 438 US 104 (1978).
97. Penn Central, 438 US at 104. Petitioners, owners of Grand Central Terminal,
alleged that the New York Landmarks Preservation Law, as applied to prevent construction
of an office building atop the Terminal, worked a taking of their property rights without just
compensation. Id.
98. Id at 130-31.
99. Id at 138.
100. "[S]ubstantially related to the promotion of the general welfare . Id at 138.
101. "[P]ermit[s] reasonable beneficial use of the . . . site .... " Id.
102. Justice Rehnquist dissented; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens joined in
the dissent.
103. Penn Central, 438 US at 145 (Rehnquist dissenting) citing Hadacheck, 239 US
394 (1915); Mugler, 123 US 623 (1887); and Goldblatt, 369 US 590 (1962).
104. Penn Central, 438 US at 145 (Rehnquist dissenting).
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those exercises which seek to prohibit a public danger.10 5 Here, the
law did not prohibit a nuisance because the construction would
have comported with safety and health requirements. 10 6 The dis-
sent conceded that the state may forbid a use that falls short of a
nuisance without effecting a taking if the prohibition applies to all
and works to the advantage of all.107 Here, the dissent found Penn
Central uniquely burdened and not reciprocally benefitted. 08
In 1979, the Court decided two takings cases, 09 virtually ignor-
ing the two part test set out in Penn Central. In Andrus, the Court
unanimously"0 held that a law prohibiting the sale of lawfully ac-
quired property"' did not effect a taking." 2 The Court said that
the loss of one property right is not a taking because the "bundle"
of property rights must be analyzed as a whole." 3 The Court held
that appellants had only been deprived of the most profitable use
of their property," 4 and that the loss of future profit without any
physical restriction on the use of property is not a taking. 1 5 In
Kaiser Aetna"6 , the Court merely cited Penn Central,"7 and used
the "too far" standard from Mahon."' The dissent, comprised of
three members of the Penn Central majority,"19 also failed to cite
105. Id.
106. Id at 146 (Rehnquist dissenting).
107. Id at 147 citing Mahon, 260 US at 393.
108. Penn Central, 438 US at 147.
109. Andrus v Allard, 444 US 51 (1979) and Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 US
164 (1979).
110. Justice Brennan authored the opinion, joined by Stewart, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Burger concurred.
111. Andrus, 444 US at 54-5. Respondents challenged their prosecution for violations
of the Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, arguing that in prohibiting
the sale of various bird parts, the Acts deprived them of property.
112. Id at 68.
113. Id at 66.
114. Id.
115. Id. The Court distinguished Mahon, 260 US at 393, because the law challenged
therein resulted in a loss of future profit as well as a physical restriction. Id.
116. Kaiser Aetna v US, 444 US 164 (1979). Petitioners had created a marina by
dredging a privately owned lagoon and connected the marina to a bay that belonged to the
United States. The United States filed suit alleging that the petitioners could not deny
public access to the marina because it had been converted into a public waterway. Kaiser
Aetna, 444 US at 164.
117. Id at 174-75 citing Penn Central to support statement that the Court has no
definite standard to determine when compensation is required.
118. Id at 178. "Here, the Government's attempt to create a public right of access . ..
goes so far beyond ordinary regulation . . . as to amount to a taking. Id citing Mahon,
260 US at 393.
119. Kaiser Aetna, 444 US at 180 (Blackmun dissenting joined by Brennan and
Marshall).
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the Penn Central test.120
The Court revived the two-part takings test in Agins v
Tiburon. 21 Although the Court concluded that the takings claim
was not ripe,122 the Court said that a regulation effects a taking
when the suspect regulation "does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land.
1 23
The following year the Supreme Court foreshortened the Agins
test in Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.1
24
The Court upheld the Surface Mining Act because it did not deny
the economically viable use of the property. 12 In Williamson Plan-
ning Commission v Hamilton Bank, 2 the Court held that the tak-
ings claim was not ripe, 27 but said that a taking results when a
property owner is denied all reasonably beneficial use of its prop-
erty. 128 In 1985 the Court held that a taking occurs when an owner
is denied all "economically viable" use of its property.
1 2
1
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided three takings cases: Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis,3 ° First En-
glish Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v County of Los
Angeles, California,'13 and Nollan et ux v California Coastal Com-
120. The dissent argued that "navigational servitude" was not a taking by definition.
Kaiser Aetna, 444 US at 188 citing United States v Kansas City, 339 US 799 (1950);
United States v Willow River Co., 324 US 499 (1945); Lewis Point Oyster Co v Briggs, 299
US 82 (1913); and Gibson v United States, 166 US 269 (1897).
121. Agins et Ux v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255 (1980). Landowners sought ruling that
zoning ordinance was facially unconstitutional. The landowners alleged that by restricting
the property to residential use, the ordinance diminished its commercial value.
122. Agins, 447 US at 260.
123. Id (citations omitted).
124. 452 US 264 (1981). Petitioners brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 USC § 1201 et seq (1976). The Court
found the act to be facially constitutional.
125. Hodel, 452 US at 297 citing Agins and Penn Central.
126. 473 US 172 (1985). Developer claimed zoning ordinance effected a taking..
127. Williamson, 473 US at 185.
128. Id.
129. United States v Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US 121, 127 (1985) (quota-
tions in original). The property owner argued that the Corps of Engineers took his property
by requiring him to obtain a wetlands permit.
130. 480 US 470 (1987). Coal companies alleged that the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act
which required that 50% of the coal beneath certain structures be left in place to prevent
subsidence was unconstitutional on its face.
131. 482 US 304 (1987). Church alleged that County ordinance prohibiting construc-
tion or reconstruction in an interim flood protection area temporarily denied the Church the
use of its land.
436
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mission.'3 2 The Court held that the law in Keystone1 33 did not ef-
fect a taking,1 3 1 citing the two part Agins test.'35 The Court distin-
guished this case -from Mahon because the law served important
public interests, '13  and because a comparison of the value remain-
ing in the property to the value taken by the restriction'" did not
show any diminution in value.'38 In First Lutheran"9 , the Court
held that, regardless of the temporary nature of a regulation, if a
regulation takes all use of property, compensation is due.' 0 The
Court did not decide whether in fact the challenged regulation ac-
tually did deny all use of the property.'' In Nollan,42 the Su-
preme Court cited the two part Agins test 143 as the standard to
determine whether the permit condition effected a taking.' 4 The
Court found that the regulation worked a taking because the con-
dition did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.'45
Earlier in the 1991 term, the Court decided Yee v City of Escon-
dido, California.'4 Although the Court cited the Nollan nexus
test 7 with approval, 48 the Court declined to address the issue of a
132. 483 US 825 (1987). The Commission granted a coastal development permit to the
Nollans subject to a condition that they allow an easement for the public to pass through
their property to reach a public beach. The Nollans alleged that the access condition was a
taking that required compensation.
133. Keystone, 480 US at 470.
134. Id at 485.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Court accepted the legislative intent that the act would protect the public
health, safety and welfare.
137. Id at 497.
138. Id at 499.
139. 482 US 304 (1987).
140. First Lutheran, 482 US at 321.
141. Id at 312. The Court held itself bound by the California Supreme Court's deter-
mination that the ordinance temporarily deprived all use and as such worked a taking. The
issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether Agins limited the remedy for a tempo-
rary taking to nonmonetary relief. Id at 311.
142. 483 US 825 (1987).
143. Noilan, 483 US at 834 citing Agins, 447 US at 260 which noted that a "land use
regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests'
and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.'" Id.
144. Nollan, 483 US at 843.
145. Id at 841. The Court found that there was no "essential nexus" between the con-
dition and the original building restriction. Id at 837.
146. 112 S Ct 1522 (1992). Mobile home park owners claimed that a rent control ordi-
nance amounted to a physical occupation, requiring compensation. The Court held that Pe-
titioners asked the Court to decide whether the regulation worked a physical occupation and
so the question of a regulatory taking was not properly before the Court.
147. See note 143 and accompanying text.
148. Yee, 112 S Ct at 1530.
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regulatory taking. 149
On the same day that the Court announced its decision in Lucas,
it denied review of a Fourth Circuit decision that the Beachfront
Management Act did not work a taking. 150 In Esposito,15' the court
of appeals dismissed the takings challenge because it found that
the Act provided a reasonable means to protect a legitimate state
interest 52 and because the property owners did not establish that
the law had deprived them of all economically viable use of their
property.1 53 In just over one hundred years, the Court has moved
from a nearly complete acceptance of the validity of the states' po-
lice power to defeat a takings claim to today's rule that a denial of
all economically viable use effects a taking.
As we move into the twenty-first century, environmental con-
sciousness has become a national, even global requirement.1 54 As
this environmental bandwagon picked up speed, it left in its wake
an ideological chasm between those who seek to protect and pre-
serve the environment and those who seek to protect and preserve
the sanctity of private property ownership. The Lucas decision was
greatly anticipated by both sides.' 55 Once the decision was ren-
dered, both sides rushed to either hail, decry, or dismiss the deci-
sion as being of little importance. 56
149. Id at 1531.
150. Esposito v South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S Ct 3027 (1992).
151. Esposito v South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F2d 165 (4th Cir 1991).
152. That interest being to "protect, preserve, restore, and enhance the beach/dune
system." Esposito, 939 F2d at 167 quoting the Act.
153. Id at 168.
154. Witness the establishment of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency in 1970, George Bush styling himself the "environmental president," and the recent
1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janiero. Richard L. Berke, Oratory of Environmentalism
Becomes the Sound of Politics, The New York Times Al (April 17, 1990); and Peter Eisner,
Down to Earth, Newsday 34 (May 31, 1992).
155. Marshall Ingwerson, Justices to Hear Cases on Rights of Property Owners, The
Christian Science Monitor 1 (January 22, 1992).
156. Supreme Court Analysis in Property Use Case Seen as Burden for Regulators,
BNA Daily Report for Executives 31 (June 30, 1992); Tom Kenworthy and Kristen Downey,
South Carolina May Have to Pay Compensation in Property Case, The Washington Post
A10 (June 30, 1992); John Marshall, Big Victory for Property Owners, The San Francisco
Chronicle A1 (June 30, 1992); Rudy Abramson, High Court Backs Compensation for Loss of
Land Rights, Los Angeles Times A15 (June 30, 1992); Geoffrey A. Campbell, High Court:
Owners to be Paid When State Laws Affect Property, The Bond Buyer 6 (June 30, 1992);
Supreme Court Ruling On Land Use a Partial Safe Harbor For Lenders, BNA Daily Re-
port for Executives 6 (July 1, 1992); Marshall Ingwerson, High Court Rules on Property,
The Christian Science Monitor 1 (July 1, 1992); Supreme Court Ruling in Lucas Unlikely




How useful will the Lucas decision be in the battle between reg-
ulators and landowners? Although the Lucas decision is being
credited with developing a "bright line test,"15 it may engender
more litigation than it precludes. The majority called its decision a
narrow one, applicable only in cases of total deprivation of eco-
nomic value.15 Since the Court accepted the lower court's finding
that the Act did indeed render Lucas' property valueless, 59 the
Supreme Court did not (rightly so) provide a framework to deter-
mine when a regulation takes all economic use from property. Jus-
tice Kennedy suggested that the equation must weigh the owner's
investment backed expectations. 60 This is a subjective standard
and is difficult to quantify. It seems destined to be slugged out in
the courts and answered on a case by case basis.
The other amorphous bright line is the Court's reliance on state
nuisance law as a standard for determining whether a regulation
works a taking.1 ' This will require the state (or other regulatory
entity) to support its action by first analyzing its state nuisance
law. This would seem to shackle regulators to the past when they
must necessarily approach their duties with a prospective eye.
The Court's rejection of legislative determination as to the nui-
sance prevention of land use regulation"' is destined to provoke
litigation. By definition, the courts must make each determination
anew.1
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Although Lucas is the logical evolutionary step in the Court's
takings jurisprudence, it is definitely not the final answer to the
question of when land-use regulations take property. Mr. Lucas
will almost assuredly win his case on remand to South Carolina
Supreme Court.' But after that decision, resolution of the next
takings case is anyone's guess. The only sure bet is that the litiga-
tion will continue.
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